In common with international agricultural trade in general the grain trade has remained immune to pressure for liberalization, and equally immune to suggestions of international management in the form of reserve stock holding, price floors and ceilings, or a full scale commodity agreement, What are the reasons for failure of such attempts in the past? Is there still a chance for GATT at least to minimize the adverse effects, especially on developing countries, of the present inefficient trading system?
T he total volume of world trade in agricultural products has grown by almost 4 per cent per year for the last three decades. Trade in grain alone grew by eight per cent per annum on average during the 1970s and was 190 per cent higher in 1980 than two decades earlier, against a total production increase of only 70 per cent over the same period. By 1980 the grain trade, led increasingly by trade in feedgrains for consumption by livestock accounted for over a quarter of non-oil bulk shipping trade. The expansion of trade in manufactures which for so long overshadowed agricultural developments was matched, and even surpassed in the 1970s by the growth of the grain trade.
The changes in the pattern of trade have been as significant as the changes in total volume. The Soviet Union has become a regular importer of substantial volumes, averaging well over thirty million tonnes per annum in each of the last four years. China has opened her ports to imports as part of her strategy of economic modernization. The EC after decades during which its member states were among the world's largest scale importers has, through the Common Agricultural Policy, achieved not just self-sufficiency but also the capacity to become a major exporter of grain. Restructuring and major gains in productivity as well as a generous support price policy on the part of the government have encouraged a continuing growth in US output almost all of which since 1970 has been exported. Japan and a few of the more rapidly growing Third World countries have accounted for a major proportion of that new trade.
Although the bulk of world grain output is consumed where it is produced, with less than a fifth of total output traded in an average year, the changes in the pattern and the scale of trade have established it as an important factor, politically as well as economically, for the countries concerned. In some US states as much as * The Royal Institute of International Affairs.
INTERECONOMICS, March/April 1983 70 per cent of farm income is now earned by exports. Grain partially offsets the adverse US trade balance. Chinese grain imports feed the cities and the army and allow greater quantities to be retained by the producers in the rural areas. Soviet imports have allowed the continued development of a livestock sector vital to the provision of food supplies to the Soviet consumer.
Growth in volume and importance, however, .has not been matched by stability. During the period of trade expansion, year to year volumes have fluctuated widely. Trade in food grains grew by 4 per cent per annum between 1960 and 1980, with an annual average variation from trend of 7 per cent. The comparable figures for feed grains were 7.6 per cent per annum and 5.1 per cent, while the annual variation for all agricultural products was only 2.6 per cent, and for total trade as low as 1.5 per cent. Within the period the average annual variation of consumption from trend worldwide doubled in the 1970s as against the 1960s.
The fact that traded grain is in essence marginal -a reflection of surplus or deficit in individual countries, and that production is particularly vulnerable to adverse weather conditions and disease, accounts of course for the volatility. The grain trade is unlikely ever to be stable or predictable. The unpredictability, however, which in particular Circumstances can have devastating effects on individual countries is enhanced by the lack of international organization or regulation of the trade. In common with international agricultural trade in general the grain trade has remained immune to pressure for liberalization, and equally immune to suggestions of international management in the form of reserve stock holding, price floors and ceilings, or a full scale commodity agreement.
Concern with the issue is of course nothing new. The attempts to bring agriculture and grains under the control of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade go back to the 1940s while efforts to create an effective wheat Agreement go back to the 1930s. The fear of shortage and famine in the 1970s generated numerous proposals in the area of food security, and repeated calls for a new global food regime but beyond a widening and strengthening of the intellectual debate little came of such proposals. The trade remains illiberal, erratic and unmanaged for reasons which are explored in more detail below. 9
Though starvation and hunger remain issues of immediate concern to the hundreds of millions of Third World citizens classed by the World Bank as the absolute poor, lacking the resources to make their all too obvious demand "effective", the issue of the early 1980s for the participants in the international grain trade is the issue not of shortage but of surplus-a reversion to the problems of the 1950s and 60s, although the passage of time has changed both the scale and the temper of the debate.
In the United States and the European Community the pressures of protectionism, and the strength of the farm lobby, coupled with achievements of technical progress which other sectors would envy, have generated large and growing surpluses of supply over demand. Grain consumption per capita in both regions has plateaued while grain output per capita has accelerated. The consequence has been that the US volume of exports has risen by 60 million tonnes in a decade and now accounts for 25 per cent of production (40 per cent of feed grain production). At the same time the farm policy of the EC has left the Community with a trade surplus in grains likely to grow according to recent forecasts to well over 20 million tonnes by 1990.
Worldwide, effective demand has not matched that growth. Prices have declined from their peak in the mid 70s (feed grain by 12 per cent, wheat by 15 per cent). Fears of supply insecurity and the perception of grain as a strategic commodity have encouraged the development of grain production in many countries, in some cases regardless of the true economics of the situation. Both the US and to a much greater extent the EC have been forced to subsidise their exports-the EC by as much as 100 per cent of the world price, contributing to the financial burden on the Community caused by export restitutions to agriculture of 6,054 million ECU, 46 per cent of the Community's agriculture budget last year.
In the recent past that situation and the competition' for markets has become sharper, even bitter, and the threat from one side of the Atlantic or the other of an agricultural trade war is almost a daily event.
In such circumstances it is worth examining the reasons for the failure of past attempts to liberalize and regulate trade and questioning whether there is indeed a way forward which does not involve a war of subsidies and an even greater misallocation of resources.
Meagre Liberalization Success
For four decades the GATT rounds of trade negotiations have failed to penetrate the agricultural sector. While tariffs on manufactured goods have been reduced and codes of practice developed, the agricultural sector has stubbornly remained beyond the reach of the general tide of liberalization. Tariff levels (in one guise or another) have actually increased and the effect of national measures on international trade has grown as that trade itself has expanded.
A major study of agricultural trade relations written a decade ago analysed the circumstances which brought this about, "in essentially all countries, and for a variety of economic, security, social and political reasons the agriculture industry is supported, planned and managed to a degree which is without parallel in any other sector of the economy, with the possible exception of defence industries... Agriculture ministers and officials regard external demands to lower import barriers as a troublesome and unwarranted interference with the national farm programmes for which they are responsible ... (Consequently) agriculture trade liberalization is an area which has had meagre success. Every country has a compelling reason to give primacy to supporting some sector of its agriculture over its general obligations under GATT and for the most part other members have acquiesced. ''1
The world market in grains, important though it is to all sides has therefore remained merely the residual result of the sum of the national policies of the major trading nations -importers and exporters. Given the fact that trade barriers and in particular the variable levies of the EC prevent the transmission of market signals though price changes 2 and the unwillingness of the United States in the recent past to accept its former responsibility for managing the market by absorbing
